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Introduction 
In 1985 Stephen Hoyt Erick was prosecuted for assault 
under section 194(1) of the Crimes Act. 1 The charge was 
that he had assaulted his six year old son Christian, who 
had been strapped many times, as punishment, for his 
behaviour towards his sister. Evidence showed there was a 
large degree of force used although there was no permanent 
injury. 
The elements of the offence under section 194 2 were 
established so Erick raised a defence under section 59 3 of the 
Crimes Act. That section justifies force, by way of 
correction, if the force is reasonable in the circumstances. 
The section establishes "the reasonableness of the force used 
is a question of fact". 4 
The major fact under consideration was Erick's 
nationality as a Niue Islander. Evidence was given as to the 
part corporal punishment plays in the upbringing of Niuean 
children. Heron J. upheld the submission that such cultural 
characteristics will be relevant to the issue of reasonable 
force. 5 
I do not think it is possible to look at this 
question in a vacuum and simply look at the extent, 
for example, of the injuries to the child concerned. 
It seems to me that it is proper in all circumstances 
to have regard inter alia to the cultural 
characteristics of the parent and the family as a 
measure of what is reasonable in the circumstances. 
He overruled the judge at first instance's decision 
to exclude the examination of cultural characteristics. As 
a High Court decision the weight of this ruling is not as 
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great as it would have been, had it been a dictum from 
the Court of Appeal. Its value is perhaps lessened by the 
fact the recognition of such characteristics was not 
necessary to the ultimate decision. However its importance 
should not be undervalued as the judge saw it important to 
rectify what had been misleading by the District Court 
judge. 
However the case was dismissed because of the evidence 
of Erick himself. He had felt remorseful for what he had 
done, indicating he considered the force used in excess of 
reasonable by his own standards. There was also evidence 
that his wife did not perceive the force used as reasonable, 
for she required an explanation from Erick. 
If there had been no evidence that Erick subjectively 
considered the force used was unreasonable we cannot 
affirmatively know what the outcome would have been. However 
the implication seems to be that as the considerations of 
Niuean culture are relevant in the determination of 
reasonable force there would have been an acquittal. 
Heron J. dismisses the trial judge's reasoning "that on 
New Zealand standards that is excessive force ... the 
community better relock at its methods of discipline while 
it remains in New Zealand 11 • 6 The trial judge had added to 
this by saying "on any objective test the treatment went 
too far ... other matters of customary discipline in my view 
have no relation to culpability. They may be considered by 
the court in mitigation only. 117 Heron J. does the exact 
opposite of this. He considers cultural characteristics as ~ 
a vital if not governing circumstance. The only reason 
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given, that the Niuean acceptance of considerable force in 
child raising did not rule the case, was the subjective 
considerations of Erick. The subjective recognition of 
excess of reasonable force took priority over any doubt that 
objective reasonableness may have placed on Erick's 
culpability. 
Essentially Heron J. answers the question of whether a 
Niuean behaved reasonably having regard to the fact he was 
governed by a culturally recognised "norm" of Niue Islanders. 
The circumstances in which the judge places reasonable are f 
those recognised by Niueans in New Zealand. He gives full 
recognition of the relevance of "customary discipline" to 
the measure of culpability. This recognition becomes a 
¥' 
problem when it is combined with its New Zealand location. 
It must be remembered that the possible result of the 
case cannot be conclusively determined. However it can be 
noted that the judge's decision gives considerable weight 
to the cultural characteristics fashioning the mode of 
Erick's behaviour. 
Prima facie the unreported case of Erick v Police 8 has 
little significance, but when its treatment of cultural 
characteristics is examined its relevance to the criminal 
law is of importance. Was Heron J. correct in placing such 
attention on cultural characteristics? 
This paper will examine the current acknowledgement 
and implications of such cultural recognition within the 
New Zealand criminal law. 
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The Classicist Theory of Criminology 
In simplistic terms a criminal offence involves a 
criminal act (actus reus). Unless absolute liability is 
intended this guilty act must be accompanied by a guilty 
mind (mens rea ) . It then becomes a question of what is a 
guilty mind and how is it determined. 
The classicist theory rests on two fundamental 
principles, those of equality and rationality. 9 The 
overriding factor is individuals are considered equally 
responsible for their actions. Whilst there may not be equal 
material status all people were deemed to have equality of 
reason. Everyone has the same ability to make rational 
d . . th . . 10 ec1s1ons over eir actions. Given this equal reasoning 
power,mitigating circumstances are not logically accommodated. 
It is assumed people always have free choice over their 
actions and thus they are always responsible. They always 
possess the capability, and are therefore in circumstances 
d . k. . 1 d . . 11 con ucive, to ma ing rationa ec1s1ons. 
From this standpoint of assumed equality and rationality 
of thought emerges principles of liability and in turn 
principles of punishment. 
On the basis of this uniform equality of reasoning 
power a hard and strict rule emerges. All criminally 
perceived acts, of a certain kind, are categorised in the 
same way, without any consideration of the individual 
y 
circumstances of the case involved. This extreme objective 
analysis creates _an assumed necessary uniformity in the 
criminal law. All acts of a certain kind are preclassified 
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as culpable and thus they are all grouped together under a 
predetermined punishment. 
In practice this concentration on a said criminal act, 
with disregard to the particular case, is impossible to 
maintain. Exceptions have therefore developed. However it 
may be said that the classicist principles of objectivity~ 
remain the core of the criminal law. 
It is somewhat paradoxical that what is cased in 
objective terms is in essence the core of subjectivity. 
That is an analysis of human intention. It is therefore no 
wonder that a balancing of objectivity and subjectivity 
causes no end of confusion. There has evolved a need to 
limit the pure objectivity of the classicist line. 
What seems to have been acknowledged,in developing the • 
criminal law, is crime is not committed in isolation of 
social circumstances. Prima facie there may be a criminal 
act, but surrounding circumstances may be relevant to 
determine an appropriate punishment for that act. 
to produce the perceived socially desired result of 
In order 
correction, differing degrees or methods of sentence may be 
more conducively employed to restore a person's preordained 
"rational thinking and free choice 11 • 12 
Alongside the development of appropriate sentencing for 
given circumstances are legal developments. Exceptions to 
the strict classicist line, safeguarded by the law itself, 
have arisen. Certain groups are perceived as justifiably 
less capable of making rational adult type decisions. 
Children may be excused liability simply because it is 
acknowledged that owing to their age they physically do not 
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have the same reasoning capabilities of a said rational 
13 adult. Similarly the insane are not regarded as having 
h h f h . 14 t e same c ance at ree c oice. 
The criminal law also provides defences so that a 
person who commits prima facie criminal acts in some 
circumstances may be excused. Circumstances like self 
d f 15 . 16 f 11 . h. e ence or provocation a into t is category. 
Behind these concessions to the harsh classicist line 
are perceptions of what is and is not culpable behaviour. 
That is what kind of behaviour is criminal or more 
specifically under what circumstances prima facie criminal 
behaviour may be excused because of the very circumstances 
in which it occurred. 
It may be accurately stated that every criminal case is ~ 
assessed in its own circumstances. Nevertheless only certain 
socially acceptable circumstances may exclude liability from 
prima facie criminal acts. Underlying all this is that, 
given certain above stated exceptions, behaviour must live 
up to one socially accepted standard. This standard in 
classicist theory is the rational free choosing man who is 
therefore individually responsible. Today the "norm" is 
expressed as "the reasonable man" or "the ordinary person" 
qualified by "in the circumstances 11 •
17 
The Concept of Objectivity in New Zealand 
New Zealand is a nation representative of many cultures. { 
If the philosophical basis of the criminal law is a consensus 
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based on equality and rationality, the people subject to 
that law should be represented by it. This does not 
necessarily justify the importation of totally differing 
customs. What this reasoning implies is that those subject 
to the processes of law (burdens of proof and requirements 
of standard) should be represented by those procedural 
requirements. This in turn imposes questions of legal 
pluralism. How far and at what stage of the law can 
pluralism justifiably develop? 
This paper is not concerned with pluralistic 
developments, within the penal system, of the different 
requirements and rehabilitative needs of different cultures. 
Nor is it concerned with change to the substantive law by f 
directly importing alien customs like multiple marriage or 
ritual killing. The concern of this paper is the greater 
recognition of cultural diversity with the procedure and 
application of the law itself. 
In the New Zealand context, for the criminal law to 
work effectively, multiculturalism should be accommodated 
within that law. The criminal law of a country should 
reflect the perceptions of criminal behaviour of the people 
of that country. A criminal law which is out of line with 
perceptions of the people it governs is incapable of 
achieving any goal for those people. The criminal law 
would become limited in its utilitarian value. Classicist~ 
theory acknowledges one of the law's goals as the deterrent 
f . . 1 b h . 18 o cr1m1na e aviour. Strictly following an objective 
rationale, out of line with public perception of criminality 
would not begin to achieve this or any other aim. 
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This paper cannot begin to assess utility or deterrent 
theories of the criminal law. Their relevance is merely 
that whatever the perceived aim of the criminal law, the 
purpose could not be achieved if the law bears no relation 
to those it governs. There would be a greater chance of 
achieving a purpose if the people being judged by an 
objective test, like the reasonable person, were representa-
tive of that standard. Of course no one is "reasonable" all ?-
the time, but reasonableness against which conduct is 
measured should represent a consensual "norm" to which the 
party being judged belongs. 
Concerning the issue of "culturalism" in the law, it 
must be recognised that New Zealand is a multi-cultural 
society. Thus what are the implications for New Zealand's 
criminal law structure by recognition that the reasonable 
New Zealander encompasses many cultures? The reasonable 
person in a New Zealand context means more than just the 
reasonable European New Zealander. Given that a large { 
proportion of the population may be classified as Maori or 
Pacific Islander the criminal law should somehow incorporate 
these cultures. In fact the argument extends to mean that 
as a major part of the population the Maori or Pacific 
Islander should not be accommodated within another structure, 
but the structure should be based equally around New Zealand's 
representative cultures. 
It is unnecessary in the context of this discussion to 
consider arguments concerning the comparative status of 
New Zealand's racial groups. 19 The question here should be 
to what extent can the variations in cultural characteristics 
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of New Zealand's multi-cultural population justify 
differential considerations of fact within the criminal law 
reasonable situation? 
In order to assess the degree of cultural diversity 
acceptable in New Zealand law, certain questions regarding 
these pluralistic developments must be considered. 
1. The present recognition of different cultures within 
the reasonable person test of the criminal law 
through cases. 
2. In what kind of cases differing cultural perceptions 
present a fundamental problem for that said 
justification behind the method of application of 
the criminal law. 
3. What is the purpose of an objective reasonable person 
test when hemmed in by considerations of culture? 
4. Given such cultural diversity is it possible to 
attain the standard of the reasonable New Zealander? 
5. What is meant by and what are the implications of 
imposing some overall "New Zealandness" in the criminal 
law? 
A Progression Through Relevant Case Law 
20 The first case of relevance,~ v McGregor, occurred 
in 1962. It concerned the defence of provocation under 
section 169 of the Crimes Act. In order for a defence under 
the section to succeed, the circumstances must have been 
sufficient "to deprive the person having the power of self 
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control of an ordinary person, but otherwise having the ~ 
characteristics of the offender, of that self control 11 • 21 
North J. concludes what must be meant by this 
section. 22 
the legislature must be regarded as having 
in contemplation a person with the power of 
self control of an ordinary person, but 
nevertheless some personal characteristics of 
his own, which are proper to be taken into 
account so that his reaction to the 
provocation is to be judged on the basis 
whether the provocation was sufficient to 
bring about loss of self control in an 
ordinary person who nevertheless possessed 
the special characteristics of the offender. 
In effect the case held that the defence of provocation i 
was primarily an objective one, but the wording of the 
statute limited its objectivity. The special characteristics 
of the offender are to be considered if the provocative v 
words were directed at that characteristic. The statutorily 
implied subjectivity was limited even further by the 
definition of what was a characteristic. This was held to 
be "something definite and of sufficient significance to 
make the offender a different person from the ordinary run ~ 
of mankind, and have also a sufficient degree of permanence 
to warrant its. being regarded as something constituting part 
of the individual's character or personality 11 • 23 
It was argued that if the characteristic meant more 
than this, the reasonable person test would lose its 
. . f. d 1 24 s1gn1 1cance an va ue . 
... in order to make the section capable of 
application, while preserving the ordinary 
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man test there must be some limitation on 
the term "the characteristics". 
North J. includes in a list of possible characteristics 
race, colour and creed. He then connects these 
characteristics to the provocation. 25 
So too if the colour race or creed of the 
offender be relied on as constituting a i 
characteristic, it is to be repeated that 
the provocative words or conduct must be 
related to the particular characteristic relied upon. 
The facts of McGregor
26 have no particular relation 
to culture, thus the discussion of culture is obiter. The 
main points at this stage to draw from the case is judicial 
acknowledgement of the possible relevance of differing 
cultures, although in a substantially limiting way. 
The relevance of consideration of culture becomes an 
. . . 1976 . h h f · 27 · issue again in wit t e case o R v Tai. Tai was 
accused of murder. He claimed to be provoked by the actions 
of "a girl he had been intimate with 11 , 28 who put an end to 
their association. Tai stabbed the woman many times. There 
had been some meetings and phone calls before the incident. 
These events combined with, just before the stabbing, where 
the girl refused to speak to Tai as soon as he demanded to 
speak to her, were the said provocative events in question. 
The defence claimed provocation (under section 169)
29 from 
these events felt by the "characteristics" of Tai. The 
problem was that provocation, as a defence to murder, has 
always required the act causing death to be almost 
simultaneously linked with the loss of self controi.
30 Thus 
the cause of the loss of self control could not be too 
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distant. Hence the problem with relying on a series of 
spread out events leading to a loss of self control, as Tai 
was trying to. Therefore it was contended there was "a 
tendency towards a slow build up of passion1131 being a i 
characteristic of Samoan people "who are by nature slow-
burning11.32 The overall submission being, that in order to 
fulfil the requirements of provocation, it must be 
recognised that characteristically the anger of Samoans 
takes longer to reach its peak than in the case of 
Europeans. Considerations of culture become an issue in 
order to accommodate Tai's actions within the historical 
criteria of the defence of provocation. 
The court held "we are prepared to assume contrary we 
think to~ v McGregor, that it could be said that this was 
a characteristic of the offender 11 . 33 It was thought however 
that the characteristic had no relevance to the issue in the 
case, which was "whether the events described could have 
caused a person, whether slow-burning or quick-burning, to 
lose his power of self-control to the extent that he would 
act in the way the appellant did 11 . 34 McCarthy P concluded 
that the answer could only be no. 
Similarly to Erick35 the exact extent of the relevance 
of culture was circumvented by other evidence. In Erick36 
it was the subjective acknowledgement that the behaviour 
was unreasonable. In Tai 37 it was concluded that, regardless 
of the presence of the "slow-burning" characteristic ., the 
events contended could not be provocative enough to warrant 
the loss of self control. 
The case of R v Taaka 38 involved the murder of the 
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accused's cousin. The incident which had apparently 
motivated the killing was what the accused believed was 
an attempted rape of his wife, by his cousin. Taaka shot 
the deceased at point blank range, at a party, two weeks 
after the attempted rape. A new trial was ordered because 
the trial judge refused to leave the defence of provocation 
to the jury.
39 
in light of ... the appellant's personal 
history and race the insult of Hongi's 
conduct would be particularly deeply felt 
by him because of his particular characteristic. 
So much so that self-control of a normal person 
might not have been enough to restrain him from 
reacting to the provocation initially given 
thirteen days previously, but revived on the 
night of the party. 
Hence the development of the relevance of culture, as 
~ 
a characteristic, in terms of the subjective elements of 
the statutory defence of provocation.
40 
In varying ways all the above cases encounter the 
problem of the degree of relevance of the acceptability 
within "another culture" of certain behaviour. "Another 
'( 
culture" may be taken to mean a culture distinct from the 
traditional pakeha on which the New Zealand criminal law 
test is primarily based. 
The kind of cases where culture becomes a problem are 
'f 
those where acceptability to another culture has become 
like a defence. In considering whether certain behaviour 
is reasonable in the circumstances, the argument is put 
forward that it is reasonable because to the specific 
culture concerned the kind of behaviour is part of that 
- 14 -
culture. The problem is especially evident when one \ 
accepted standard is radically different between two cultures. 
For example, in Erick v Police
41 where the Niuean accepted 
standard of corporal punishment for children is much more 
violent than the traditional white New Zealand level. In 
Tai 42 and Taaka
43 the issue becomes the problem of treating 
an accepted practice, of Pacific Island countries, as 
reasonable in New Zealand. 
An argument contended for Tai was it is traditional 
or customary for rejected Samoan men to assault, or even 
kill, the other party to a marriage or like relationship, 
when it has broken up. The court rejected this submission 
as confusing the existence of a "native practice" in another 
country with the existence of a characteristic in the 
offender himself. It was concluded the presence of one does 
not imply the presence of the other.
44 
... tribal acceptance of approval elsewhere 
of killings contrary to the law could not be 
accepted on any possible reading of s.169 as 
a ground for reducing a homicide, committed 
in New Zealand, from murder to manslaughter. 
In essence the submission confused the 
existence of a native practice in another 
country with the existence of a characteristic 
in the offender himself. 
It should be acknowledged that a Samoan, living in 
New Zealand, who has grown up with such a custom (if it can 
be adequately established as existing)
45 may have it 
ingrained in their personality sufficiently to be termed a 
"characteristic". Given that a significant proportion of 
the population is Samoan, it may be too simple to dismiss 
- 15 -
that cultural aspect on the grounds it comes from elsewhere. 
While the existence of such a customary practice does not 
~ 
inunediately exonerate a defendant, it still has some 
bearing. What has to be established is the extent of that 
bearing. 
None of the cases tackle the problem raised by the 
recognition of cultural characteristics. 
.46 Tai was 
dismissed on the grounds the evidence raised was insufficient 
to afford a defence of provocation. The problem may have 
been not that the evidence itself was insufficient, but that 
it was given insufficient weight. The defence of provocation 
looks for characteristics of the offender which may remove 
47 
self control of an ordinary man. McGregor lays down these 
characteristics must be relatively permanent not transient. 
Without analysing the precise depths of Tai's characteristics 
it is enough to appreciate that in some cases customary 
behaviour will have played a suitably large role in a 
person's life and cannot be so easily separated from them. 
That is, that whilst the practice exists in another country 
it may also exist in the offender himself. McCarthy P 
assumed too readily that the distinction of existing 
elsewhere or being a characteristic was valid. The line is 
not as precise as he implied. Hence the proposition that 
insufficient weight was given to such a claim. 
We may draw from an examination of these cases that 
there is a leaning towards recognition of culture. It 
should be noted that that leaning is somewhat awkwardlo/ 
contained within the existing criminal law structure. 
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Considering Objectivity 
Behind the objective test lies the notion there is a 
consensus about the uniformity and order imposed by the 
strict classicist line, or today by the use of a modified 
objective test. Hence presumed consent in the justification 
behind the application of objectivity. This general 
ideology of consensus cannot be a justification if the \ 
consensus does not actually exist. The idea behind the 
consent theory is that "individualism" is sacrificed in 
exchange for the benefits of uniformity. The justification 
of consensus falls down if, the end result means, various ~ 
sections of societies consent is not reflected in the law. 
It would seem therefore the only way to reflect necessary 
consent, is to allow differential considerations of fact. 
The route to obtaining a reflection of a multi-cultural 
~ 
society's perceived criminality, and hence the society's 
consent, is to recognise the cultural variants. 
¥ 
The question remains however the extent to which these 
differential considerations may exist. To what degree can 
cultural pluralism be accommodated within the criminal law? 
A Consideration of Pluralism 
In simplistic terms legal pluralism means a situation 
where two or more systems of law interact. What seems to 
be involved is the recognition by "state law" of some other 
principle belonging to a different legal culture. This 
- 17 -
pluralism takes many different forms depending on the kind 
of cultural interaction involved.
48 For the purposes of 
this paper pluralism forms part of the discussion as it is 
the term applied to the infusion of culturalism into the 
prevailing legal system. The form this infusion usually 
takes is in a dominant system with subservient counterparts.
49 
The proposition is that this sort of imbalance is wholl~ 
inappropriate in the New Zealand context. 
In consideration of an acceptable degree of pluralism 
to New Zealand, there are two extremes. 
a) 
b) 
a hard line classicist type objectivity which 
excludes acknowledgement of variant cultural 
characteristics i.e. no concept of pluralism. 
a collection of "norms" relating directly to 
the relevant culture, but in isolation of each 
other. 
Obviously neither of these extremes are satisfactory. 
What has to be found is a balance where the "extreme 
pluralism" of b) is limited yet not regressing too far into 
the strict objectivity of a). 
Most pluralistic legal systems are formed in the 
dominant/servient mode. This feature does not aid maximum 
utility of the law. Nor is it compatible with the greater 
theory of consensus behind the application of the law. 
What it achieves is an invidious discrimination. It would 
on the other hand seem legitimate to discriminate between 
cultures in order to cater for their inherent characteristics. 
The balancing factor of ~hat legitimate discri~inatioD is 
that such an acknowledged cultural freedom does not override 
- 18 -
the rights of the rest of the society. The traditionally 
espoused reasons for limiting pluralistic developments 
encase this idea of "the rest of society's rights''. Hence 
the best way to preserve society's rights as a whole was 
thought to be uniformity throughout the criminal law. The 
concern seems to be that without a dominant force those ,· 
principles of uniformity and equality will disappear 
resulting in arbitrariness and administrative inefficiency. 
How can there be pluralistic developments yet the law 
may be preserved from arbitrary application and 
inconsistency? 
The Concern of Arbitrariness and Inefficiency 
Arguably ease of administration is support for 
regulating pluralistic developments. However it cannct be 
substantially justified as a sole reason for limitation. 
It may add to arguments, concerning the fear of arbitrariness, 
coinciding with the greater development of pluralism. 
The adoption of greater cultural recognition does not 
necessarily substantiate the ''fear of arbitrariness". The 
assumption is that arbitrariness will be avoided, and 
uniform equality obtained, by the application of one 
consistent rule. There are however two relevant consider-
ations of uniformity. Firstly there is the idea of 
uniformity through consistent objectivity. Secondly 
uniformity may be achieved through equal treatment, by the 
law. There is an argument that equal treatment may entail 
- 19 -
equal cultural recognition. 
The argument is not that simple. Equal treatment does 
not necessarily equate with exclusive cultural consideration. / 
The main point of consideration, as regards this large 
jurisprudential area of what constitutes equal treatment in 
any legal system, is that the assumption of the need for 
uniformity as the basis for any standard of objectivity,· 
may not be as firmly based as such a proposition initially 
implies. What is being suggested here is that equality may 
not be achieved by the consistent application of the same rule. 
That rule may be a "norm" of some of the people it is 
applied to, but not of others. If only some of society is 
measured against a standard which reflects their view of 
. ' 1 · 5 0 th ' 11 1 t tm t 51 . E 1 crimina ity ere is not overa equa rea en. qua 
treatment may therefore mean criminal assessment against a 
51 
standard to which the party in . question belongs. 
The arguments in support of "objectivity", from the 
traditional standpoint, centre around the assumption that 
having that kind of regulation ensures smooth functioning 
of the law. Any argument of that kind is outweighed by 
the lack of value in applying a norm where the subject does 
53 
not recognise its value. 
Pluralistic developments do not necessarily lead to 
arbitrariness unless taken to the extreme of unrelated 
systems of law. Variants of interpretation should not be 
considered arbitrary, but appropriate to the circumstances. 
This sort of pluralism does not mean a lack of control, but 
a simple diversity of interpretation on justifiable grounds. 
The differing interpretations are not for arbitrary reasons, 
- 20 -
but for sound reasons on the facts of each case. The 
sound reasoning relates back to the consideration that it 
is not sensible to assess an accused against a standard 
which has little relevance to them~ The principles in 
determining what facts are relevant to each case involve an 
establishment of guidelines. 54 The considerations in 
determining such guidelines have been described as follows. 
The crucial objective in defining the scope 
of the defence is to advance the goals of 
individualised justice and cultural pluralism 
while recognising the concerns reflected in 
the desire for common values.~6 
55 
On the contrary the selection of one norm over others 
to apply to all cases seems like an arbitrary choice. The 
more a predetermined line of objectivity, regarding certain 
behaviour, becomes the focus of a certain type of offence, 
a blur is placed on the reality of the individual cas~. 
This blur is arguably more arbitrary because it relates not 
to the case involved, but to a hypothetical tenet. In turn 
the hypothetical nature of this tenet questions any useful 
value it may have: 
This is not to suggest that currently the criminal law 
is interpreted from a total objective viewpoint. It is 
merely an emphasis on the evident lack of sense or value 
in interpreting one culture in terms of anothei. The lack 
of value in artificially applying a set of one culture's 
"norms" to a situation where they cannot be accorded with 
the facts. 
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The Scope of New Zealand's Interpretive Pluralism 
As discussed earlier, the strict application of the 
totally objective classicist test was modified in the face 
of social reality. New Zealand's social reality is its 
1 . 1 1 · 57 mu ti-cu tura ism. If any objectivity, like the current 
reasonable person, is to justifiably remain in the criminal 
law it is to be a reasonable person in terms of that 
multi-cultural ism~ 
h .58 h d . In t e Tai case Mccarty P attempts to efine the 
scope of this pluralism in terms of the standard of the 
59 
ordinary New Zealander. 
By "ordinary person" is meant naturally, an 
ordinary New Zealander - not only one of 
exclusively British blood or background. We 
have in this country a population of markedly 
mixed racial origins with, especially a 
substantial Polynesian minority. What has to 
be contemplated by the trial judge (and later 
the jury), difficult though it be, is an 
ordinary person in terms of that mixed 
society, one who could be expected to react 
in the way people who commonly accept current 
New Zealand standards. 
Not surprisingly however he leaves up in the air what 
these common standards are and how they are to be recognised 
or interpreted. 
What he seems to be suggesting is an assimilation of 
two contrary ideas." Whilst the relevance of different race 
and culture are acknowledged the reasonable person test, as 
it stands, and such factors are not really compatible~ 
Hence the problem of assimilation of the two ideas in the 
- 22 -
cases. If the test were to be strictly interpreted this 
would involve assessing one culture in terms of another. 
In reality this is not possible if both cultures are to 
keep their distinct identities. 
McCarthy P, in his above quote assumes that it is 
possible, given the cultural variations, to form a standard 
of the reasonable New Zealander. As he points out, this is 
a difficult task. I would respectfully suggest that there 
cannot be an overall "norm" which can be sensibly applied 
to New Zealand's multi-cultural society. In acknowledging 
diversity of cultural "norms" it is somewhat artificial to 
then assume there is a set of common standards·. 
Practically the true nature of a sensible test in 
New Zealand should not be an objective one importing 
subjective characteristics, but a subjective test remembering 
that there must be some objectivity: This inversion 
recognises the emphasis should not be on an imposed and 
possibly irrelevant norm, but upon the relevant considerations 
of the case before the court: This increased subjectivity 
is not as specific as greater individual recognition, but it 
should be concerned with an individual belonging to a culture 
which recognises a certain acceptability of behaviour. 
In practice this would involve firstly considering each 
case at face value. To consider in light of the specific 
circumstances whether such an act could be in any way 
justifiable, because of the actor. This is not to allow for 
legislation of a diversity of concepts. It is not a change 
aiming at the content of the law, but at the procedure of 
the law~ It is acknowledgement of the practical and 
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justifiable significance of cultural factors to the 
application and procedures of the criminal law. 
However there must be an overall acceptance of a 
decision to New Zealanders. Whilst acknowledging the 
specific characteristics of the irrunediate case there must 
be a degree of compliance with the substantive demands of 
the criminal law in order to make a decision valuable in 
a practical way. Somehow the demands of equal treatment and 
uniformity must be achieved throughout New Zealand: 
The question becomes how and what is that proposed 
objectivity? The aim cannot be to find an average which 
accurately reflects all New Zealand cultural perspectives. 
The relevant culture for each case should be the centre of 
the applied test, but this has to be modified. A Niuean or 
Samoan cannot be tested as if they were in Niue or Samoa. 
For example, whilst it is relevant that Erick in beating 
Christian may be behaving in a reasonable Niuean manner, 
Erick is not in Niue. Nor does the law governing him cater 
exclusively for Niueans. This is where the relevance of a 
multi-cultural society becomes plain. 
0
The culture under 
consideration must be looked at with regards to the society 
in which it exists. Hence there emerges an objective limit 
on the proposed subjectivity: 
Given that we are to maintain a central degree of 
equality and uniformity (as substantive demands of the 
criminal law) it seems impossible to admit cultural 
characteristics as a complete and separate defence. This 
would seem to firstly undermine those substantive require-
ments and secondly that culturalism has a role in the law 
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greater than a simple defence additive; 
Although, it has been argued that the balance between 
individualized justice and cultural pluralism would be 
struck by the admission of a cultural defence per se.
60 In 
a sense, such a defence would be easier to frame and 
administer. However its separateness as a defence undermines 
the principles of liberal justice, which the recognition of 
cultural diversity advocates~ 
The problem of determining the uniformity and equality 
(borne out by McCarthy Pin Tai 61 ) is that when cultural 
characteristics are considered in the context of a 
reasonable person in the circumstances an imbalance is 
struck. The judges discuss the relevant culture in terms 
of what is deemed a "reasonable person". What really is 
happening is as soon as you consider what is acceptable to 
a culture you are considering what is the reasonable person. 
That is to say, you are considering what is the socially 
accepted "norm" of that culture. 
Conclusion 
The position reached so far is that a certain line of 
New Zealand cases point to a problem concerning interpretive 
pluralism, as regards cultural diversity in the assessment 
of criminal culpability. The problem is that admitting the 
relevance of culture into the criminal law involves a clash 
of legal principle. On the one hand the demands of 
objectivity to make the criminal law workable and generally 
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applicable. On the other hand the implied subjectivity of 
allowing variant considerations of fact as regards cultural 
diversity. 
In broad terms this is a problem pervading the whole 
l c.. w 
criminalAin the seeming erosion of objective principles, 
when a case requiring greater subjectivity is presented: 
We have seen the inadequacy of laying down a static 
set of principles in the classicist experience. What needs 
to be done is an investigation into New Zealand's cultural 
diversity. This in turn will lead to an inquiry of the 
criminal law's role in such a multi-cultural society. Hence 
a consideration of which principles of criminality should be 
paramount in New Zealand law. 
This consideration of the function of law with regard 
to society is a re-emergence of the greater principle that 
the criminal law is acceptable · and of some value to its 
adherents. An attempt has been made to encompass these 
requirements in the idea of a reasonable New Zealander, but 
which greater examination has revealed inadequate. 
What this overall "New Zealandness" focus involves is 
a task for the legislature and the judiciary. It is a 
consideration only defineable through practice, experience 
and the gathering of empirical information. However it is 
a problem which should no longer be circumstantially avoided 
by cases like Erick v Police. 62 
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